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NEW JERSEY v. T.L.O.: THE SUPREME COURT'S LESSON
ON SCHOOL SEARCHES
GERALD S. REAMEY*
A 14-year-old high school freshman and her companion were dis-
covered by a teacher smoking in their school lavatory, an area in
which smoking was not permitted.1 The girl, T.L.O., was taken to
Assistant Vice Principal Theodore Choplick, to whom she denied
smoking altogether.2 Mr. Choplick demanded T.L.O.'s purse, opened
it, and found a package of cigarettes inside.' As he removed the evi-
dence from the purse, he observed a package of cigarette rolling pa-
pers which, because of his experience, he believed related to the use of
marihuana.4 Mr. Choplick's further search of the purse uncovered a
small amount of marihuana,5 a pipe,6 several empty plastic bags,7 ap-
proximately forty dollars in small bills and change,8 an index card
listing the names of students who owed T.L.O. money,9 and two let-
ters implicating the student in drug dealing. 10 These items of evi-
dence were subsequently used, along with the confession of selling
marihuana given by T.L.O. to the police, to adjudicate the student a
delinquent and suspend her from school.11
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law; B.A., Trinity Uni-
versity; J.D., LL.M., Southern Methodist University. The author gratefully acknowledges the
research assistance of Mr. Steve Goodman, Class of '86 of St. Mary's Law School, in the
preparation of this article.
1. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 53 U.S.L.W. 4083, 4084 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985).
2. See id. at 4084.
3. See id. at 4084.
4. See id. at 4084.
5. See id. at 4084.
6. See id. at 4084.
7. See id. at 4084.
8. See State ex rel. T.L.O., 428 A.2d 1327, 1330 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1980).
9. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 53 U.S.L.W. 4083, 4084 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985).
10. See id. at 4084. One of these letters was a handwritten request by T.L.O. to a friend
asking the friend to sell marihuana in school. See State ex rel. T.L.O., 428 A.2d 1327, 1330
(N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1980).
11. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 53 U.S.L.W. 4083, 4084 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985). In her con-
fession, T.L.O. admitted that she had been selling marihuana in school and that, on the day of
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T.L.O.'s motion to suppress was denied by the trial court, 2 and she
appealed on fourth amendment grounds to the intermediate state ap-
pellate court. 13 In a divided opinion, the Appellate Division held that
the fourth amendment applied to the search by the school official, but
concluded that the search was a reasonable one because Mr. Choplick
had "reasonable cause" to believe it necessary to maintain discipline
or enforce school policies.' 4 The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed
the Appellate Division, not because the standard adopted by the
lower court was incorrect,' 5 but because the search was unreasonable
under that standard.' 6 It was the court's determination that the fed-
eral exclusionary rule applied to illegal searches conducted by school
officials, just as to those conducted by the police.'7
The State of New Jersey subsequently petitioned for certiorari on
the grounds that the exclusionary rule should not apply to school offi-
cials unless law enforcement personnel were involved in the search.'"
It was conceded by the State that the "reasonable cause" standard
applied by the New Jersey Supreme Court was "appropriate and that
the court had correctly applied that standard."' 9
The United States Supreme Court, after hearing argument on the
exclusionary rule issue, ordered reargument to consider the applica-
bility of the fourth amendment and whether the standard applied by
the New Jersey courts was indeed correct.2° On that reargument, the
the search, she had sold 18 to 20 marihuana cigarettes for one dollar each. See State ex ret.
T.L.O., 428 A.2d 1327, 1330 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. ReL. Ct. 1980).
12. See State ex rel. T.L.O., 428 A.2d 1327, 1330-34 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1980).
The juvenile court subsequently adjudicated T.L.O. a delinquent and imposed a probated sen-
tence. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 53 U.S.L.W. 4083, 4084 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985).
13. See State ex rel. T.L.O., 448 A.2d 493, 493 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982).
14. See id. at 493-94.
15. The New Jersey Supreme Court held, as had the Appellate Division, that a school
official may conduct a reasonable search for evidence if reasonable grounds exist "to believe
that a student possesses evidence of illegal activity or activity that would interfere with school
discipline and order." See State ex rel. T.L.O., 463 A.2d 934, 941-42 (N.J. 1983).
16. See id. at 942. The court reasoned that the assistant principal lacked reasonable
grounds to believe that T.L.O. had evidence of a rule infraction or crime in her purse. See id.
at 942. There was no basis for his belief that the purse contained cigarettes, but had there
been, the official had no reason to seize the cigarettes since the rule violated pertained to the
area in which students were permitted to smoke; smoking or possession of cigarettes was not
prohibited. See id. at 942.
17. See id. at 939.
18. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 43 U.S.L.W. 4083, 4085 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985).
19. See id. at 4085.
20. See id. at 4086. Professor Yale Kamisar has been quoted as speculating that the
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State of New Jersey urged adoption of a "reasonable suspicion" stan-
dard in lieu of the "reasonable cause" applied by the New Jersey
Supreme Court.21
Ultimately, the reasonable suspicion standard prevailed as the
United States Supreme Court held: 1) the fourth amendment applies
to school officials as to other "state officials"; 2) students may, in ap-
propriate circumstances, claim a legitimate expectation of privacy in
their personal effects; and 3) on balance, evaluating the reasonableness
of a search under the attendant circumstances better serves the inter-
ests of the state than strict adherence to a probable cause standard
and also adequately protects the privacy rights of the students in an
educational environment. 22 The Court refused to require that a war-
rant be obtained23 and reserved judgment as to the exclusionary rule
question.24
To appreciate the significance and persuasiveness of the Court's
holding, it is worthwhile to briefly consider various approaches taken
by jurisdictions addressing cases similar to T.L. 0.23 This is most ef-
fectively done and easily understood by analyzing the fourth amend-
ment issues in their logical turn. The threshold question is, of course:
Does the fourth amendment apply to students and their educators? If
it does not, the inquiry ends. But if school officials are state officers
governed by the fourth amendment and the rights guaranteed by the
amendment are enjoyed by their students, the issue then is the level of
suspicion required before a search can be performed. Concomitantly,
the scope of the permitted search becomes an important concern. Fi-
nally, it must be determined whether the traditional warrant require-
ment exists in the context of school searches, or whether instead a
reargument was ordered because a majority could not be obtained in favor of abolishing the
exclusionary rule for searches conducted by school officials. See Stewart, And in Her Purse the
Principal Found Marijuana, 71 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1985, at 54.
21. See Stewart, And in Her Purse the Principal Found Marijuana, 71 A.B.A. J., Feb.
1985, at 50, 52.
22. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 53 U.S.L.W. 4083, 4085-87 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985).
23. See id. at 4087.
24. See id. at 4085 n.3.
25. For good general discussions of the law relating to school searches, see W. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.11, at 452-72 (1978
& Supp. 1985); W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 39(k) (1985); W. RINGEL,
SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 17.2(1984). A more dated but useful
survey of the jurisdictions may be found in Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 978 (1973).
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blanket exception or one or more specific exceptions to the warrant
requirement apply in the schools.
The question of whether the fourth amendment is applicable turns,
in the first instance, on whether school officials, like Vice Principal
Choplick, are "state officers."'2 6 In what one author has termed the
"early view, "27 courts refused to apply the Constitution to educators
because of the so-called in loco parentis doctrine. 28 The essence of this
approach is that because the fourth amendment does not control the
actions of private parties, it cannot control the conduct of school offi-
cials acting on behalf of private parties (the parents).29 The doctrine
has been applied less and less frequently in recent decisions, largely
due to the educational realities that militate against its use. The prin-
cipal argument against its continued vitality may be summarized as
follows: School officials work for the state; they enforce compulsory
attendance rules as well as regulations governing the conduct of stu-
dents within their care, under authority that is not coextensive with
that of parents. 3° Further, the fruits of their searches of students, like
26. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
213 (1960).
27. See W. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS 17-3 (1984).
28. See id. at 17-3. The term in loco parentis simply means "in place of the parent" and
has been employed as a shorthand way of describing the relationship between educators and
their students by reference to the parental relationship. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.1 (a) (1978). The employment
of the doctrine in school search cases has probably never been universally accepted, but it is
true that it once enjoyed more popularity than it does currently. Two authors went so far as to
write in 1976, "[u]ntil recently, the school's right to search a student's person or his locker has
been little questioned." Phay & Rogister, Searches of Students and the Fourth Amendment, 5
J.L. & EDuC. 57, 57 (1976). This conclusion was based on the characterization of school
officials as private persons to whom the fourth amendment does not apply. See id. at 57.
While the doctrine may have come under increasing criticism in recent years, it has not been
entirely abandoned by courts considering school searches. See R.C.M. v. State, 660 S.W.2d
552, 554 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The Texas court of appeals, in
R. CM., acknowledged the waning use of the doctrine, but felt itself bound by prior law to
continue it in Texas. See id. at 554.
29. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT § 10.1 l(a), at 453-56 (1978); Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in
Public Schools, 59 IOWA L. REV. 739, 767 (1974). A variation on this theme has been that
school officials, even if not acting in loco parentis, were acting as private persons in their own
right and were not, therefore, state officials. See In re Donaldson, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220, 221-22
(Ct. App. 1969); Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59
IOWA L. REV. 739, 765 (1974).
30. See Comment, Students and the Fourth Amendment. "The Torturable Class" 16
U.C.D. L. REV. 709, 713-14 (1983). One commentator has also noted the vast difference in
the protective nature of a parent's supervision and the disciplinary nature of a school official as
[Vol. 16:933
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searches conducted by law enforcement personnel, may lead to crimi-
nal prosecution in addition to school disciplinary measures. 31
In TL. 0., the Supreme Court first noted that the fourteenth
amendment had already been held to apply to public school officials
and that the fourth amendment was applicable to the states through
the fourteenth.32 Logically, then, the fourth amendment would also
appear to apply to public school officials.33 The State of New Jersey,
however, had argued that the fourth amendment is applicable only to
law enforcement officers, and since the fourteenth amendment gov-
erns school officials, the fourth does not. 4 The Court rejected such a
restrictive view of the fourth amendment, noting that in the past it has
often been applied to persons other than law enforcement agents.3 5
Moreover, the Court stated that the in loco parentis doctrine was "in
tension with contemporary reality and the teachings of [the] Court. 36
Since school officials are state officers for purposes of the first amend-
ment 37 and the fourteenth amendment,'3  the T.L.O. Court saw no
reason to reach a different result in search cases.3 9 School officials,
enforcing compulsory attendance policies and disciplinary functions
authorized, or even required, by state law are not acting "merely as
surrogates for the parents."'
The decision that the fourth amendment applies to student searches
further reason for abandoning the in loco parentis doctrine. See Buss, The Fourth Amendment
and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59 IOWA L. REV. 739, 768 (1974). It is also note-
worthy that students of more maturity are entitled to greater privacy and less supervision by
even their parents. Ultimately, by at least college age, parents would have no legal authority
over their children, and, therefore, someone standing in the stead of the parents would scarcely
have a better claim than they. See Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 997-98 (D.N.H. 1976).
31. See Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 991-92, 996-97 (D.N.H. 1976). The court
held that, while a school may justify a search for evidence of conduct that would disrupt the
"operation of its academic functions," it may not engage in supervisory searches whose pur-
pose is instead criminal prosecution. See id. at 998. For a summary of the criticisms of in loco
parentis in its various applications, see W. LAFAVE, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: A TREATISE
ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.11(a), at 453-56 (1978).
32. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 53 U.S.L.W. 4083, 4085-86 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985).
33. See id. at 4085-86.
34. See id. at 4086.
35. See id. at 4086.
36. See id. at 4086.
37. See id. at 4086 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969)).
38. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 53 U.S.L.W. 4083, 4086 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985) (citing Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)).
39. See id. at 4086.
40. See id. at 4086.
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by school officials does not, of course, resolve the question of whether
students enjoy full fourth amendment protection while attending
school. The current view, based largely on analogy to the first4 and
fourteenth amendment42 cases, is that they do.43 Even so, considera-
ble disagreement persists as to the extent to which fourth amendment
rights possessed by students may frustrate reasonable attempts by ed-
ucators to maintain the order necessary to preserve an educational
environment." Indeed, the push and pull of these often competing
interests has led many courts to assume, without expressly holding,
that students are possessed of fourth amendment guarantees in their
headlong rush to address the more difficult underlying conflict.4"
In TL. 0., the Supreme Court considered an argument advanced by
the State of New Jersey that the "pervasive supervision" of school
children diminishes the legitimate expectation of privacy a child may
41. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506-07
(1969). Tinker has been cited repeatedly by the courts and commentators, sometimes in tan-
dem with In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), as support for the proposition that school students
are not without benefit of constitutional protections merely because of their educational status.
See, e.g., Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 52 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Buss, The Fourth Amend-
ment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59 IOWA L. REV. 739, 740-43 (1974); Schiff,
The Emergence of Student Rights to Privacy Under the Fourth Amendment, 34 BAYLOR L.
REV. 209, 211-13 (1982); Trosch, Williams & Devore, Public School Searches and the Fourth
Amendment, 11 J.L. & EDuc. 41, 43-44 (1982); Comment, Students and the Fourth Amend-
ment. "The Torturable Class'" 16 U.C.D. L. REV. 709, 717 (1983).
42. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
43. See materials cited supra note 41. The Georgia Supreme Court implicitly recognized
the possession of fourth amendment rights by students, but pointed out that the first and four-
teenth amendment rights accorded them in Tinker and Goss were "a dilute version of those
accorded adults." See State v. Young, 216 S.E.2d 586, 593 (Ga. 1975); see also Gardner,
Sniffing for Drugs in the Classroom-Perspectives on Fourth Amendment Scope, 74 Nw. U.L.
REV. 803, 813-16 (1980).
44. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT § 10.1 l(b), at 456-64 (1978).
45. For example, the Louisiana Supreme Court held simply, after a relatively lengthy
discussion of the status of educators as state officers, that, "therefore, their students must be
accorded their constitutional right to be free from warrantless searches and seizures." See
State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317, 319 (La.), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975). Although the United
States Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Mora, the Louisiana Supreme Court held on
remand that its requirement of probable cause for student searches was based on federal and
state law, thereby precluding further review. See State v. Mora, 330 So. 2d 900, 901-02 (La.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976). This cursory attention to the question of students' inherent
fourth amendment rights is reflected in one leading commentator's observations that:
"Although the courts have stated or assumed that the fourth amendment does apply to stu-
dents in public schools, they have not generously applied that amendment's protection as
against searches conducted by or with the aid of school administrators." Buss, The Fourth
Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59 IOWA L. REV. 739, 743 (1974).
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have in property "unnecessarily" brought to school.46 Pointing out
that schools and prisons are not the same for fourth amendment pur-
poses,47 the Court expressly rejected the contention that privacy
rights are checked at the schoolhouse door: "Although this Court
may take notice of the difficulty of maintaining discipline in the public
schools today, the situation is not so dire that students in the schools
may claim no legitimate expectation of privacy."48
The Court concluded that the necessity of maintaining security and
order in the educational environment was an important interest de-
manding a measure of flexibility for its effective attainment, yet with-
out sacrificing legitimate privacy interests of the students.49 This
flexibility is achieved in part by dispensing with the warrant require-
ment 5° and in part by modifying the level of suspicion required to
authorize a search.5'
After noting that probable cause is ordinarily required to support a
search,52 the TL.O. majority employed a balancing of governmental
and private interests to determine whether the search of the student's
purse was a reasonable one within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment. 53 First, rather than requiring the usual probable cause stan-
dard, the Court held that if reasonable grounds exist to believe that
the search will uncover evidence of a violation of criminal law or a
school rule or regulation, the search is "justified at its inception.", 4
The scope of the search must then be justified by a determination that
the measures adopted are "reasonably related to the objectives of the
46. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 53 U.S.L.W. 4083, 4087 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985).
47. See id. at 4087.
48. See id. at 4087.
49. See id. at 4087.
50. Terming the warrant requirement "unsuited to the school environment," the Court
cited the practical difficulties inherent in the warrant process as excusing its application. See
id. at 4087. Particularly, the Court held that requiring a warrant in every student search case
would "unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary proce-
dures needed in the schools." See id. at 4087.
51. See id. at 4087.
52. See id. at 4087.
53. See id. at 4087. Reasonableness, the Court held, requires a determination that the
search was justified at its inception, and, if so, whether the procedure employed is within the
scope dictated by the circumstances supporting the search. See id. at 4087. In holding that the
reasonableness was the appropriate focus, rather than probable cause, the Court reserved the
question of whether individualized suspicion is an essential part of reasonableness. See id. at
4088 n.8.
54. See id. at 4087-88 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
1985]
ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:933
search," taking into account the "age and sex of the student and the
nature of the infraction.""
Applying this standard in TL. 0., 56 the Court segregated the initial
search for cigarettes from the subsequent search for marihuana.5
The search for cigarettes, the Court reasoned, was supported by the
teacher's report to Mr. Choplick that T.L.O. had been smoking in the
lavatory. 8 Possession of cigarettes was not itself violative of a school
rule59 and "would not. . . necessarily be inconsistent" with T.L.O.'s
claim that she had not been smoking. 60 The Court concluded, how-
ever, that the. search for what was admittedly "mere evidence" 61 was
permissible to corroborate the report that T.L.O. had been smoking
and to "undermine the credibility" of her story that she did not
smoke at all.62 Once the assistant vice principal was legitimately in
the purse, reasonable suspicion to continue his investigation was pro-
vided by the cigarette rolling papers he found.63 The continued explo-
ration of the search, including the reading of the letters, was held
reasonable in light of the relationship of the contents to marihuana
dealing."M
By its decision, the Supreme Court simultaneously clarified and
confused the legal parameters for searches of students. The rejection
of the in loco parentis doctrine by itself represents a significant ad-
55. See id. at 4088.
56. See id. at 4088. The Court acknowledged that the standard adopted was not "sub-
stantially different" from that utilized by the New Jersey Supreme Court. See id. at 4088.
57. See id. at 4088.
58. See id. at 4089. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that Mr. Choplick had no more
than a "good hunch" that the purse contained cigarettes. See State ex rel. T.L.O., 463 A.2d
934, 942-43 (N.J. 1983). The United States Supreme Court found this "puzzling" in light of
the fact that the teacher had told Mr. Choplick that T.L.O. had been smoking. See New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 53 U.S.L.W. 4083, 4089 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985). But the majority had already ac-
knowledged that finding cigarettes did not necessarily indicate that T.L.O. had been smoking.
See id. at 4088. The Court explained that while the teacher's information only indicated that
T.L.O. might have cigarettes in her purse, absolute certainty was not required in any event.
See id. at 4088.
59. See id. at 4088. The New Jersey Supreme Court held the search unreasonable, in
part, for this very reason. See id. at 4088.
60. See id. at 4088.
61. See id. at 4088.
62. See id. at 4088.
63. See id. at 4089. Mr. Choplick's conclusion that the rolling papers were indicative of
marihuana use was not disputed by T.L.O. See id. at 4089.
64. See id. at 4089. The reading of the letters was contested by T.L.O. as exceeding the
scope of a reasonable search, but the Court permitted examination because of the suspected
trafficking in drugs. See id. at 4089.
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vance in bringing clarity, certainty, and consistency of application to
this form of search.65 The "private action" claim made on behalf of
school teachers and administrators may now usually be set aside alto-
gether, or at least carefully scrutinized in a light unfavorable to its
acceptance.66
More importantly, recognizing that searches by public school offi-
cials are state action acknowledges the "contemporary reality" of the
school-state relationship and thereby enhances the persuasiveness of
fourth amendment interpretations in the school context. 67 Not only
are school officials employees of the state, they are charged with the
responsibility of carrying out state regulations, policies, and laws,
often to the penal or educational detriment of the student.68
When school officials are engaged in investigations of criminal vio-
lations by students, and prosecution is anticipated along with or in
lieu of administrative discipline, the courts have more often treated
school officials as state agents or imposed higher standards of suspi-
cion before permitting a search.69 But tying the characterization of an
65. See id. at 4086. As previously noted, some jurisdictions have clung to the legal fiction
that educators enjoy the same freedom from fourth amendment constraints as parents, while
many others have abandoned the doctrine. Compare R.C.M. v. State, 660 S.W.2d 552, 554
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ refd n.r.e.) (adhering to doctrine) with State v. Young,
216 S.E.2d 586, 591 (Ga. 1975) (school officials are state officers governed by fourth amend-
ment). See generally Phay & Rogister, Searches of Students and the Fourth Amendment, 5 J.L.
& EDUC. 57, 57 (1976).
66. Careful scrutiny of the claim would, in itself, be an advance. As one commentator
has noted:
The phrase in loco parentis has become a substitute for analysis, and consequently is de-
serving of the description which the Supreme Court once gave to the similar term parens
patriae: a "Latin phrase [which was] proved to be a great help to those who sought to
rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme."
W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.1 1(b),
at 456 (1978) (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)).
67. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 53 U.S.L.W. 4083, 4086 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985); see also
R.C.M. v. State, 660 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In
R.C.M., the Texas court of appeals characterized the in loco parentis doctrine as "rather
harsh," and observed that, "[w]e cannot ignore that school officials have considerable discre-
tion in restricting students of their vested constitutional rights without regard to the reasona-
bleness of the detention or search." Id. at 554. Nevertheless, the court concluded that, "in
this case, however, we are bound by the controlling common law doctrine of in loco parentis."
See id. at 554.
68. See Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59
IOWA L. REV. 739, 768 (1974) (discusses disciplinary aspect of educator's responsibility);
Comment, Students and the Fourth Amendment: "The Torturable Class" 16 U.C.D. L. REV.
709, 714 (1983) (discusses educator's enforcement of rules and regulations).
69. See Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1220-21 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Smyth v. Lubbers,
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educator to the purpose of his search is inherently frustrating. The
Gordian knot of multiple purposes can be cut only by treating all
school officials as agents of the State when they conduct searches. By
adopting this approach, the TL. 0. Court burdened the judicial sys-
tem with deciding fourth amendment questions in virtually every
school search case. On the other hand, it also helped assure that
school children would not see their individual constitutional rights
flaunted by those charged with their education.7"
If school officials are agents of the government for search purposes,
wrongful deprivation of the rights of students raises the issue of vindi-
cation of those rights.71 It is significant to note the degree to which
unlawful searches by school teachers and administrators give rise to
actions for money damages as civil rights violations.72 The most con-
troversial and widely applicable remedy, however, is the exclusion of
criminal evidence, the application of which in school cases was not
decided by the T.L.O. Court.7 3
398 F. Supp. 777, 786-87 (W.D. Mich. 1975); L.L. v. Circuit Court of Washington County,
280 N.W.2d 343, 348 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979); see also RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, AR-
RESTS AND CONFESSIONS 17-4, -5 (1984); Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Stu-
dents in Public Schools, 59 IOWA L. REV. 739, 755 (1974); Phay & Rogister, Searches of
Students and the Fourth Amendment, 5 J.L. & EDUC. 57, 57 (1976).
70. This sentiment is reflected in the opinion of Justice Brennan: "It would be incon-
grous and futile to charge teachers with the task of embuing their students with an understand-
ing of our system of constitutional democracy, while at the same time immunizing those same
teachers from the need to respect constitutional protections." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 53
U.S.L.W. 4083, 4091 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in
part).
71. See Phay & Rogister, Searches of Students and the Fourth Amendment, 5 J.L. &
EDUC. 57, 58 (1976). In their article on school searches, Professors Phay and Rogister suggest
four possible remedies for unlawful school searches: 1) criminal prosecution for violation of
privacy rights under 18 U.S.C. § 242; 2) a civil suit for violation of privacy under state law or
42 U.S.C. § 1983; 3) exclusion of the evidence obtained in a subsequent school proceeding; or
4) exclusion in a criminal prosecution. See id. at 58.
72. See id. at 58-59; Schiff, The Emc.: ence of Student Rights to Privacy Under the Fourth
Amendment, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 209, 226 (1982).
73. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 53 U.S.L.W. 4083, 4085 n.3 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985). As
stated, it may be that the applicability of the exclusionary rule was a primary reason for order-
ing reargument. See Stewart, And in Her Purse the Principal Found Marijuana, 71 A.B.A. J.,
Feb. 1985, at 50, 54. Justices Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan would have applied the exclu-
sionary rule to school searches. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 53 U.S.L.W. 4083, 4096 (U.S.
Jan. 15, 1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). In chastising the majority
for not addressing the exclusionary rule issue, Justice Stevens wrote:
Thus, the simple and correct answer to the question presented by the State's petition for
certiorari would have required affirmance of a state court's judgment suppressing evi-
dence. That result would have been dramatically out of character for a Court that not
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Use of the exclusionary rule when searches are not conducted by
the police is arguably less likely to deter fourth amendment violations
and is not therefore warranted when judged by a cost-benefit analy-
sis.74 But the lack of deterrence argument cannot be considered in
isolation. If exclusion has even limited deterrent effect, it should be
maintained against school officials unless other remedies for fourth
amendment violations are entirely effective. 5 If disregard for consti-
tutional guarantees is truly intolerable, a procedure incremently de-
creasing the incidence of such abuse should be maintained or
employed until no evidence of significant violation remains. r Only
then could the effect of elimination of remedial procedures be accu-
rately gauged.
Moreover, a number of courts have applied the exclusionary rule to
school officials,7 6 apparently without sufficiently ill effect to result in
change. It would be curious indeed if the Supreme Court were to
finally settle the strictures of the fourth amendment on educators only
to strip away the disincentive for them to ignore its mandate.
Of course, if the civil remedy provided students by acknowledging
state action were an effective one, the benefits of the exclusionary rule
might well fail to balance its costs. But practical hindrances and legal
exceptions inhibit the efficacy of these actions. In Wood v. Strick-
land, 7 7 the United States Supreme Court engrafted on civil rights ac-
tions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a "good faith" exception for
public school officials. 78  This exception, taken with the reduced
only grants prosecutors relief from suppression orders with distressing regularity, but also
is prone to rely on grounds not advanced by the parties in order to protect evidence from
exclusion.
Id. at 4096.
74. See State v. Young, 216 S.E.2d 586, 589-91 (Ga. 1975). Of course, this argument fails
entirely if the school official is acting at the behest of the police, or in conjunction with them,
since law enforcement agencies are most likely to be deterred by application of the exclusion-
ary rule. See Schiff, The Emergence of Student Rights to Privacy Under the Fourth Amend-
ment, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 209, 216-17 (1982).
75. See Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59
IOWA L. REV. 739, 741-42 n.20 (1974). Professor Buss suggests a "natural temptation" for
police to profit from the nonapplicability of the exclusionary rule to school officials by having
the educators conduct their searches for them. See id. at 741-42 n.20.
76. See Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 238-39 (E.D. Tex. 1980);
Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 794-95 (W.D. Mich. 1975); State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317,
320 (La. 1975); see also People v. J.A., 406 N.E.2d 958, 960-61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); People v.
D., 315 N.E.2d 466, 468-69, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403, 405-07 (1974).
77. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
78. See id. at 322. The Court held: "A compensatory award will be appropriate only if
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fourth amendment protections inherent in a reasonable suspicion
standard, the elimination of the warrant requirement, and the adop-
tion of a balancing approach, dramatically reduce the likelihood of
success for the plaintiff student. Moreover, few students will have the
financial resources or perseverance to pursue a protracted damage ac-
tion.7 9 The exclusionary rule assumes greater significance in deterring
misconduct by school officials when considered in light of the rather
restricted availability of the civil remedy. 0
It is also critical to the availability of these procedures of redress
that the Court recognized at least some expectation of privacy by stu-
dents while at school."1 Of course, the legitimacy of a student's ex-
the school board member has acted with such an impermissible motivation or with such disre-
gard of the student's clearly established constitutional rights that his action cannot reasonably
be characterized as being in good faith." Id. at 322. The defense was compared with that
existing for police civil rights suits in which the officer acted in "good faith and with probable
cause." See id. at 317 (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)). The obvious fallacy in the
comparison is that for police officers to be excused from their mistakes by acting in good faith,
they must also have acted with probable cause. The school official is held to a much lower
standard of suspicion, a fact that substantially diminishes the only factor preventing a defense
based solely on the school official's good faith.
79. See Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 794 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
80. See id. at 794. In Smyth, Chief Judge Fox noted: "Where, as here, the authorities
who violated the Constitution were not demonstrably guilty of bad faith, the exclusionary rule
remains the only possible deterrent, the only effective way to positively encourage respect for
the constitutional guarantee." Id. at 794. In Jones v. Latexo Independent School District, a
federal district court in Texas reached an identical conclusion about the exclusionary rule:
"The failure to apply a corollary of the exclusionary rule in this context would leave school
officials free to trench upon the consitutional rights of students in their charge without mean-
ingful restraint or fear of adverse consequences. Such a result would be intolerable, particu-
larly in our schools." 499 F. Supp. 223, 239 (E.D. Tex. 1980). The example set for students by
use of the exclusionary rule was a core consideration for Justices Stevens, Marshall, and Bren-
nan in their dissent from the Court's avoidance of the issue:
Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to the meaningful exercise of
rights and responsibilities by a self-governing citizenry. If the Nation's students can be
convicted through the use of arbitrary methods destructive of personal liberty, they can-
not help but feel that they have been dealt with unfairly. The application of the exclusion-
ary rule in criminal proceedings arising from illegal school searches makes an important
statement to young people.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 53 U.S.L.W. 4083, 4096 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part & dissenting in part).
81. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 53 U.S.L.W. 4083, 4087 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985). This is in accord
with prior case law that extended constitutional protection to students. See, e.g., In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1 (1967); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969);
Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 52 (N.D.N.Y. 1977). See generally Buss, The Fourth
Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59 IOWA L. REV. 739, 740-43 (1974).
NEW JERSEY V TL.O.
pectation may vary from one situation to another, 2 a fact implicit in
the adoption of a balancing test to judge the proper scope of a search.
The search of T.L.O.'s purse demonstrates how her privacy expecta-
tions in its contents could be overcome where the initial intrusion was
supported by adequate suspicion and the scope of the search was rea-
sonably related to its purpose.8 3 If the Court had relied instead on a
general diminution of privacy approach for students, its approach
would have been more consistent with prison search cases.8 4
While the TL.O. majority did not directly hold that a student's
expectation of privacy was lower because of his status, the result is
substantially the same. The Court set the interests of society in main-
taining order and discipline in schools alongside those of the student
in preserving his privacy rights.8 5 Without expressly modifying those
rights, the Court approved measures designed to "strike the balance"
between them and the needs of the school.8 6
The first of these measures was the abolition of the warrant require-
ment for school searches.87 This cumbersome process was thought to
"unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal dis-
ciplinary procedures needed in the schools."'88  Ironically, the Court
82. See Comment, Students and the Fourth Amendment: "The Torturable Class", 16
U.C.D. L. REV. 709, 718-20 (1983). A distinction may be drawn, for example, between the
expectation of privacy in a purse, school locker, and the student's car parked in the school lot.
Of the three, the locker is the least private because it belongs to the school and the student's
use of it is nonexclusive. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 339 (1984);
Phay & Rogister, Searches of Students and the Fourth Amendment, 5 J.L. & EDUC. 57, 65-67
(1976); Comment, Students and the Fourth Amendment.: "The Torturable Class", 16 U.C.D.
L. REV. 709, 718-20 (1983). The student's person and items immediately associated with the
person, like a purse, enjoy a somewhat higher expectation of privacy. See New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 53 U.S.L.W. 4083, 4097 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissent-
ing in part). Compare People v. D, 315 N.E.2d 466, 469, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403, 407 (1974) (find-
ing higher expectation of privacy in student's person) with People v. Overton, 249 N.E.2d 366,
367, 301 N.Y.S.2d 479, 480-81 (1967) (no expectation of privacy in locker where school main-
tained extensive control). The student would also be justified in an expectation of privacy in
his locked vehicle higher than that in a locker but perhaps less than that in a purse, depending
on the part of the vehicle in which an item is stored.
83. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 53 U.S.L.W. 4083, 4087-88 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985).
84. See id. at 4087 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977)). Justices Powell and
O'Connor would have held that students have a "lesser expectation of privacy than members
of the population generally." See id. at 4089 (Powell, J., concurring).
85. See id. at 4087.
86. See id. at 4087.
87. See id. at 4087. None of the Court dissented from this holding.
88. Id. at 4087.
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cited language from Camara v. Municipal Court,8 9 which strictly re-
quired warrants, in support of its avoidance of warrants: 90 Undenia-
bly, requiring school officials to obtain warrants would sometimes
coincidentally lead to untenable results. While educators could surely
prepare adequate affidavits to support the warrant, 9' they would prob-
ably refer the investigation to the police instead. 92 Police involvement
would almost invariably result in prosecution if the search revealed
sufficient evidence, a disposition not always desirable.93 The warrant
issue is not, however, so easily resolved as the T.L.O. opinion sug-
gests. Existing exceptions to the warrant requirement, combined with
analogues in the school context, greatly reduce the incidence of
searches pursuant to warrant.94 Furthermore, in those cases requiring
a warrant, it may be that a modified procedure for its issuance, taking
into account the speed and informality desirable in school searches,
would better serve.95
Another measure taken by the Court in T L. 0. to strike a proper
balance was reduction of the level of suspicion required to justify the
search at its inception. 96 Permitting a school search on reasonble sus-
picion rather than probable cause was not an innovation with
TL.O.97 Justice Blackmun's persuasively articulated concurrence,
describing the educational needs placed in balance with students' pri-
89. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
90. Of course, in Camara, the Court employed a balancing test similar to that used in
T.L. 0., but a warrant was still required, albeit on a reduced level of probable cause. See id. at
532-33.
91. While it may be thought that teachers and school administrators should be excused
from the warrant requirement because they are ill-equipped to understand and articulate the
requisite level of suspicion to obtain a warrant, the argument cuts the other way as well: The
review of a neutral, detached magistrate is nowhere more necessary than in those situations in
which the affiant misunderstands constitutional requirements. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.1 (d), at 470 (1978).
92. If they did not involve the police in obtaining the warrant, they would often do so to
execute the warrant.
93. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT § 10.11(d), at 470 (1978).
94. See id. at 470; Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public
Schools, 59 IOWA L. REV. 739, 748-53 (1974).
95. See Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 792 (W.D. Mich. 1975) (suggesting internal
warrant procedure); see also W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.1 l(d), at 470-71 (1978).
96. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 53 U.S.L.W. 4083, 4087 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985).
97. See id. at 4087. The Court noted that it joined the majority of other courts that have
considered the issue in adopting a reasonable suspicion standard. See id. at 4085 n.2, 4087.
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vacy rights, cannot be disregarded in considering this most difficult
issue.98 But the balance struck, easing the justification of school offi-
cials to search students, is arguably unnecessary. 99 The probable
cause standard should not be abandoned unless the educational inter-
ests of students clearly outweigh the expectation of privacy conced-
edly enjoyed by them."°
Admittedly, there may be a practical reason for dispensing with
warrants. No such reason exists, however, for lowering the level of
suspicion supporting a search. The TL.O. majority focused exclu-
sively on the fact that educators would be spared the "necessity of
schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause and permit
them to regulate their conduct according to the dictates of reason and
common sense."'' One of the clearest messages of recent United
States Supreme Court cases interpreting the fourth amendment and
its probable cause standard is that the concept is common sense and
nontechnical. 12 Apparently then, the "niceties" of probable cause
are no more than an application of "reason and common sense,"
rather than a more onerous standard. Moreover, the teacher or ad-
ministrator, like Mr. Choplick, is usually possessed of more verifiably
reliable information than the police. This may be developed through
close observation of those in his charge with whom he spends a great
deal of time, 03 or it may come from student or teacher "infor-
98. See id. at 4090-91 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See generally Buss, The Fourth
Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59 IOWA L. REV. 739, 769-76 (1974).
99. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 53 U.S.L.W. 4083, 4092-95 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); see also W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.1 l(b), at 459 (1978).
100. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 53 U.S.L.W. 4083, 4093 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part). Justice Brennan completely eschewed application of a
balancing test once it had been determined that the fourth amendment applies to school
searches. See id. at 4093 (Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). But if balanc-
ing was to be used, he would have struck that balance differently: "In particular, the test
employed by the Court vastly overstates the social costs that a probable cause standard entails
and, though it plausibly articulates the serious privacy interests at stake, inexplicably fails to
accord them adequate weight in striking the balance." Id. at 4093 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part & dissenting in part).
101. See id. at 4088.
102. See Texas v. Brown, - U.S .... 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543, - L. Ed. 2d -, -
(1983); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 53 U.S.L.W.
4083, 4093-94 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
103. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT § 10.1 (b), at 459-60 (1978).
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mants."' 1  When the source is the latter, problems of reliability asso-
ciated with informants used to assist criminal investigations are often
absent. 105
Finally, reduction of the level of suspicion justifying a search will
inevitably increase the incidence of mistake, particularly in the ab-
sence of review by a magistrate. Since probable cause is not certainty,
or even proof beyond a reasonable doubt, some mistakes would occur
anyway if this higher standard was adopted in the interest of society's
legitimate need to detect and prosecute crime in schools. But substan-
tial intrusions of the sort permitted by the Court in T.L. 0. should not
be based on the slender reed of reasonable suspicion, unless the pur-
poses served by the search are the functional equivalent of those justi-
fying a search for criminal evidence.
This distrust of lower standards of suspicion is heightened when the
suspicion extends beyond the parameters of criminal activity, as it
does in school searches. 10 6 The T.L.O. Court related suspicion to
both criminal activity and "rules of the school."' 1 7 If suspected viola-
tion of trivial rules not subverting the educational needs of students
may be the basis of a full-blown search, the balance struck by the
Court accords privacy rights no weight in such cases."0 8
It is the result suggested by this skewed balance that is the most
alarming facet of the decision in TL. 0. 109 Balancing competing in-
terests to achieve reasonableness is often appropriate, but, like all fluid
concepts, it requires great care to avoid abuse," 0 and whatever its
104. See id. § 10.11(b), at 459-60.
105. See id. § 10.1 (b), at 459-60. This is especially true after adoption of the "totality of
circumstances" approach in gauging reliability and the ease with which information could be
corroborated in the school setting. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 53 U.S.L.W. 4083, 4094 (U.S.
Jan. 15, 1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 238 (1983).
106. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 53 U.S.L.W. 4083, 4097-98 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
107. See id. at 4097-98.
108. See id. at 4097-98.
109. Justice Brennan's opinion reflects this concern: "The question facing the Court is
not whether the probable-cause standard should be replaced by a test of 'reasonableness under
all the circumstances.' Rather, it is whether traditional Fourth Amendment standards should
recede before the Court's new standard." See id. at 4094 (Brennan, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part).
110. See LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (of Improbable Cause, Imperceptible Plain
View, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing Askew), 74 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1199-
1214 (1983). The Supreme Court has considered a balancing test for detentions under the
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virtue, it is likely to foster inconsistency of application and result.1I1
When measure after measure is removed from one side of the balance
without tipping the scales, it can only be because gravity is stayed by
an interested hand.
fourth amendment and cautioned against its use without reference to the nature of the intru-
sion. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 206-16 (1979).
111. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 53 U.S.L.W. 4083, 4095 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part).
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